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War II, AI has advanced enormously, and 
the U.S. military has continued to show 
a steady appetite for acquiring lethal 
robots. Tomahawk cruise missiles, the 
great-grandchildren of the Norden, once 
launched find their own way to far-dis-
tant targets over even the most compli-
cated terrain; yet the enemy sometimes 
eludes the Tomahawks, which end up 
killing the wrong people. The Phalanx 
ship-defense system is another impor-
tant military robot—many missiles 
move too fast for human reflexes—but 
Phalanx, limited to close-in, Gatling-gun-
like defensive fire, is unlikely to cause 
collateral damage to noncombatants. 
For all the advances in AI, there re-
mains a significant reluctance to em-
brace the notion of fully autonomous 
action by machines. Hence the popular-
ity today of remotely controlled aircraft 
and ground combat systems. Indeed, 
the growth in the number of drone pi-
lots has been explosive, and soldiers on 
the ground have become very attached 
to their machine buddies; there have 
been instances when drones have been 
given medals, and have been ceremoni-
ally buried when “killed in action.” It is 
fascinating to see the great emotional 
appeal of the machines juxtaposed 
with the intellectual fear of what robots 
might do in the future, when they be-
come more able to act independently.
That fear is more than just the resi-
due of the dark tropes of the Termina-
tor and Matrix film franchises—not to 
mention Ultron—or of the “Battlestar 
Galactica” TV series reboot; or, for that 
matter, of the worries about robots 
most recently expressed by luminaries 
like Stephen Hawking. There are real 
and practical concerns about auton-
omy and flawed machine judgment. 
How is a robot to determine the differ-
ence between enemy soldiers and non-
combatants? This is a difficult-enough 
problem for human soldiers in the ir-
regular wars of our time. Other ques-
tions are: When should a robot keep 
fighting or stop shooting if the foe is 
wounded, or is trying to surrender? In 
the case of a robot-piloted attack air-
craft, can it discriminate between mili-
tary and civilian targets adequately?
Even worse, can robots be hacked? 
The Iranians claim to have hacked an 
American drone and brought it down 
safely on their territory back in 2011. 
However it happened, they have it, and 
refused to return it when President 
Obama somewhat cheekily asked for it 
back. This incident should prompt us 
to consider the question: What if ro-
bots could be taken over and turned on 
their masters? A coup of this sort would 





Isaac Asimov’s Three 
Laws of Robotics, first 
codified in his 1942 short story “Run-
around” (http://bit.ly/1AAkKhW), 
sought to steer use of artificial intelli-
gence (AI) in peaceful directions. Robots 
were never to harm humans, or by inac-
tion allow them to come to harm. Within 
months of the elucidation of these laws, 
however, an extremely primitive robot, 
the Norden bombsight, was being put 
to lethal use by the U.S. Army Air Corps. 
The bombsight combined a computer 
that calculated various factors affecting 
an aircraft’s arrival over a target with an 
autopilot. Touted for its accuracy from 
high altitude, the Norden nevertheless 
tended to miss the aim point by an aver-
age of a quarter-mile. Yet pilots routinely 
turned over control to the machine for 
the final run to target.
In the 70 years since the end of World 
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phistication and an absolute mastery 
of the radio-electromagnetic spectrum, 
but the consequences of one side being 
able to do this would be catastrophic for 
the side whose robots were taken over.
Strategic concerns aside, on the po-
litical front, ethical and practical con-
cerns about robots have been raised at 
the United Nations, which in an April 
2013 report called for an immediate 
moratorium on the development and 
deployment of “lethal autonomous 
robots.” The report is part of a valiant 
effort to stave off the onset of an AI 
arms race, but indicators from many 
places are that the race is already on. 
In Britain, for example, the Taranis 
combat aircraft (named for the Celtic 
god of thunder) has autonomous ca-
pabilities, unlike the Predators and 
other types of drones we have become 
familiar with over the past decade. The 
British are also moving toward field-
ing robot soldiers; their humanoid 
Porton Man reflects exceptional so-
phistication of design.
The Russians are not far behind, al-
though their Strelok sharpshooter and 
Metalliste machine gun and grenade 
launcher systems, while apparently hav-
ing some autonomous capability, seem 
to be under fairly close human control. 
But don’t count on it staying that way. 
The Chinese military is making swift 
advances in both remote-controlled 
and autonomous systems, on land, at 
sea, and in the air. Their advances in na-
val mine warfare include weapons that 
can sense the type of ship coming along 
and move stealthily to attack it. There 
is also evidence of Chinese sea mines 
with a capability to detect and then at-
tack helicopters flying above them.
Against these threats, the U.S. Navy is 
developing autonomous mine-clearing 
technologies, giving the undersea fight 
an increasingly robot vs. robot flavor.
The same is true in cyberspace, 
where the sheer speed and complexity of 
offensive and defensive operations are 
driving a shift to reliance on robots for 
waging cyberwars. This is an area about 
which little can be said openly save that 
here is yet more evidence that the arms 
race the United Nations seeks to prevent 
is well under way. That suggests it is high 
time for an international conference, 
and an accompanying discourse, on 
the prospects for crafting robotic arms 
control agreements. In this way, we can 
keep alive the ideal of peaceful robotics 
that Asimov introduced so long ago.
There may be no way, ultimately, to 
stop the spread of killer robots, but at 
the very least they should be obligated 
to observe the laws of armed conflict, 
like their human counterparts.
Duncan A. Buell 
“Computer Security 




One hears from the science commu-
nity that scientists need to stand up 
and explain their science to the public. 
The usual topics—climate change, evo-
lutionary biology, stem cell research—
are outside the normal scope of most 
ACM members, but we in the computer 
sciences are the experts on one matter 
that has enormous impact.
In the wake of the 2000 U.S. presiden-
tial election, Congress passed the Help 
America Vote Act (HAVA). The nation 
largely turned away from older election 
technology and moved to computer-
based systems, in some states relying 
entirely on the software and sometimes-
arcane procedures that provided no sec-
ondary method against which to com-
pare the tally produced by the software.
Now, as the HAVA machines age, 
many election officials around the 
country and around the world seem en-
chanted with the marketing hype of In-
ternet voting software vendors and are 
buying in to the notion that we could—
and should—vote online now and in 
the very near future.
Never mind the almost-daily reports 
of data breaches of financial organiza-
tions with deep pockets to spend on 
securing their computers. Never mind 
that governments, with shallower pock-
ets, are routinely hacked, or that former 
FBI director Robert Mueller went on 
the record that the only two kinds of 
computers are those that have already 
been hacked and those that no one has 
yet bothered to hack. Election officials 
seem in awe of ill-defined vendor terms 
like “military-grade encryption.”
In a small corner of the ACM world, 
scientists wonder why officials are not 
hearing the message of computer secu-
rity experts. It is time for that small cor-
ner to expand and for the membership 
to find a voice in hopes that election of-
ficials can be made to listen.
ACM members are moderately aware 
that Alex Halderman of the University of 
Michigan and his students (legitimate-
ly) hacked the test Internet voting soft-
ware of the District of Columbia. They 
are probably less aware that Halderman 
and Vanessa Teague of the University of 
Melbourne recently demonstrated that 
vendor software being used for an Aus-
tralian statewide election was subject 
to a standard security flaw. Teague and 
Halderman responded in the best man-
ner of professionals recognizing a flaw: 
they alerted the Australian CERT, which 
alerted the New South Wales Election 
Commission (NSWEC), which patched 
the software. Then Halderman and 
Teague went public, but the software 
patch to prevent votes from being inter-
cepted and changed in flight to election 
central did not happen until one-fourth 
of the total online votes were cast.
The response from the NSWEC was 
both dismissive and frightening. On the 
one hand, it was admitted the NSWEC 
had factored the likelihood of cor-
rupted votes into their analysis. On the 
other hand, they targeted Teague with 
a formal complaint to her university, 
accusing her of a breach of ethics and 
suggesting further that a DoS attack was 
coming from the University of Michi-
gan. The NSWEC then had the audacity 
to publish with the vendor a puff piece 
(http://bit.ly/1GVp4Nr) on online voting 
without mentioning the security flaw.
The Australian election is not an 
anomaly. Many U.S. states are toying 
with the notion of online voting, con-
tracting their elections to private com-
panies whose code has never been given 
a public vetting. As scientists, we would 
all probably rather be doing science 
than trying to find ways to convince the 
public and election officials that secu-
rity online today is not up to the task 
of voting online today. Yet the need is 
critical for disseminating the hard facts 
about computer security and the huge 
risks of online voting. We must take 
this on as a professional responsibility. 
The nation and the world deserve no 
less than our full involvement.
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